Four pillars of anti-corruption in Customs: the Polish experience

IT systems, people management, society, and law enforcement: the cornerstones of success

Twenty years ago, Poland confronted a critical challenge: how to effectively curb the spread of corruption within its Customs Service. The question was not only what strategies to implement but also how to achieve meaningful results in a relatively short time-frame. While no approach is without flaws, certain aspects of Poland’s experience stand out as positive and instructive.

Given the shared border between Ukraine and Poland, their similar history within the former socialist bloc, and the possibility of joining a unified EU Customs Area in the near future, the lessons learned from Poland’s efforts could offer valuable insights for Ukraine as it navigates similar challenges.

In 2003, on the eve of its accession to the EU, Poland ranked 64th out of 133 countries in the Corruption Perceptions Index published by Transparency International (TI), with a score of only 3.6 out of 10 (where 10 indicates no corruption).

The percentage of citizens convinced of the prevalence of corruption in Poland also increased yearly (according to Ośrodek Badania Opini Publicznej (OBOP), a state research body survey). In 1999, 43% of respondents considered corruption to be very widespread, 54% in 2002, and 68% in 2003. Only 3% of those surveyed believed that corruption was a rare phenomenon. Social tolerance for corruption was relatively high.

As a result, significant attention was paid to transparency and anti-corruption policies.

The success of anti-corruption efforts within Polish customs can be attributed to several key factors. First, reducing of the human factor through the implementation of advanced IT tools has significantly minimized opportunities for corrupt practices. Second, strategic people management, including the careful division of duties and responsibilities within the Customs Service, has further strengthened internal controls. Additionally, raising salaries to levels comparable with other law enforcement services has enhanced job satisfaction and reduced the temptation for corrupt behaviour.

Third, public anti-corruption campaigns have been pivotal in fostering a culture of transparency and accountability within customs operations. This progress has been driven by effective collaboration between customs authorities and external organizations, which has helped to reinforce these values across the board. Fourth, the coordinated efforts of PL Customs Service with law enforcement agencies—including the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (CBA), the Internal Security Agency (ABW), the Border Guard (SG), and the Police—have been essential in identifying, prosecuting, and deterring corrupt activities within the customs system.

Below are the specific measures that have contributed to these outcomes.

Bottlenecks

To effectively combat corruption, it was essential to accurately diagnose the causes where the system was “failing” and creating or enabling opportunities for corrupt activities. Some of the main “bottlenecks” identified in Poland were:

– Excessive power concentrated in the hands of a single official, primarily due to the failure to apply the principle of separation of functions among different officials in decision-making procedures.

– Officials had the discretion to make decisions, often due to a lack of clear and transparent criteria for resolving cases, allowing them to act outside the established rules.

– The lack of formal justification for decisions, documented in writing, records of proceedings, made it difficult to conduct ongoing oversight of decision-making processes.

– Weak internal control units, primarily due to poor organization (actions were mostly taken ad-hoc) and inadequate staffing.

– Collective rather than individual responsibility, resulting in a “dilution” of accountability for decisions made.

– A weak training program that concentrated on legal rules rather than changing the state of the main and perception of corruption.

– Ineffective anti-corruption legislation that did not provide effective tools for enforcing its provisions.

In summary, the main causes included flawed legislation allowing officials “freedom of maneuver”; the human factor, which sometimes seeks to exploit this freedom for personal gain; and the lack of fear of inevitable punishment in case of such exploitation. Addressing these causes became the basis for developing an action plan to combat customs corruption.

Poland’s Customs Anti-Corruption Plan was adopted in June 2010 in response to the increase in detected cases between 2004 and 2008. Consultations were held with the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (CBA), Bathory Foundation NGO and business organizations.

IT Systems – the key to reducing the human factor

IT tools are among the most effective means not just of combating but preventing corruption. They reduce or even eliminate the presence of officials in the process. The absence of direct contact between customs officials and traders minimizes opportunities for corruption. Records helped to conduct supervision and internal control.

Initially, Poland introduced IT tools for managing shifts, declarations, and control. The following systems were implemented and are in operation: electronic queuing for clearance, recording every step of the clearance process, automatic risk analysis, system selection of customs officials to the positions and system indication for inspection.

Additionally, the Polish e-Customs Plan for 2008-2013 was adopted, covering external, infrastructure, and internal components. The list of systems was determined according to the EU’s Multi-Annual Strategic Plan for Customs (MASP-C).

It was important to recognize that IT systems themselves, under certain circumstances, could also become tools of corruption in the hands of a select group. Therefore, Poland adhered to certain design principles in system development.

Customs defined the functional requirements internally based on the guidelines and in consultation with EU TAXUD. To minimize risks of failure, a tender was conducted for each component separately. External developers were involved in each component. Customs developed only smaller, non-critical elements in-house. A Customs Steering Committee was established to coordinate the development of IT systems.

People Management

It’s clear that the human factor cannot be entirely eliminated, so people management is just as crucial.

First, regarding roles and responsibilities. In Polish customs, seven key “players” within Customs were identified to engage in the fight against corruption. It became obvious that it takes almost all Customs to fight with corruption phenomena and to share responsibility in their respective areas:

1. Head of the Customs Service – overall responsibility (project leader).

2. Coordination Group in the central customs HQ – coordination of efforts, preparation of reports, cooperation with business organizations, NGOs, and research agencies.

3. Control Team (special unit) – responsible for enforcing the law, cooperating with external agencies, analysing cases, identifying root causes of corruption, and preparing a risk register.

4. HR Department staff – responsible for recruitment, training, and competitions.

5. Heads of customs departments (control, audit, organization) – responsible for implementing anti-corruption procedures and elements.

6. IT personnel – responsible for implementing anti-corruption elements into IT systems and tools.

7. Field commanders and middle-level staff – responsible for enforcing anti-corruption policies.

Regarding personnel management, key measures included anti-corruption training for new and existing staff, transparent recruitment campaigns, the introduction of incentive/motivation systems for customs officers, practical implementation of personnel rotation, random selection of officials assigned for control, inspections and audits conducted based on risk analysis, as well as instructions on handling bribery offers and pressure.

To achieve the set objectives, a comprehensive approach was implemented, involving organizational improvements, enhanced control measures, financial incentives, and educational activities.

Organizational improvements focused on refining internal processes, such as the division of responsibilities, ensuring multiple layers of oversight during control and post-control operations (the “many-eyes principle”). Additionally, the staffing at border crossings was increased, and the potential for repeat inspections was enhanced. Procedures were also established for reporting and notifying authorities about corruption attempts, while control decisions were increasingly informed by risk analysis. A system for the random selection of posts for service further minimized the potential for misconduct.

Control measures were strengthened through the monitoring of control areas at border crossings and close cooperation with authorized services, including the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (CBA), the Internal Security Agency (ABW), the Police, and the Border Guard (SG).

Financial incentives played a crucial role in motivating staff. Salaries were increased, and additional allowances were provided to those in border and crime-fighting units, making these positions more competitive and rewarding.

Educational activities were also a key component, emphasizing a zero-tolerance policy towards corruption and changing the perception of corruption as a cancer on the state body that impacts society, economy and security. Anti-corruption training, including courses and seminars, was provided to ensure that all personnel were well-informed and committed to upholding the highest standards of integrity.

Society

Since the main stakeholder in the fight against customs corruption is society, particularly businesses and citizens, Poland initiated a Public Anti-Corruption Campaign. It was conducted both offline and online, including social media. The campaign was based on collaboration with business partners and NGOs to identify potential areas of corruption, develop solutions to curb corruption, and inform about anti-corruption procedures. Meetings, seminars, and joint initiatives were held as part of this campaign.

In supporting this public campaign, the Polish customs leadership demonstrated its commitment to a “zero tolerance” policy towards corruption.

Law Enforcement

The Polish Customs Service had no internal investigation powers; it could only join investigations conducted by other law enforcement agencies as a partner.

As part of the customs anti-corruption strategy, close cooperation with the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (CBA) was initiated to combat corruption. This included identifying areas, processes, and positions exposed to corruption, assessing the resistance of implemented processes and IT tools, and collaborating with authorized services (CBA, ABW, Police, SG) in investigations for withdrawing conclusions for improvements.

In 2011, the legal right to use polygraphs was implemented, primarily for creating special surveillance units and later for recruiting new employees, as well as in justified cases.

In a relatively short time, Poland made significant steps in enhancing its anti-corruption efforts within customs. Poland elevated its position in the TI Corruption Perception Index from 63rd in 2010 to 41st out of 176 countries in 2012 and the score from 3,6 to 41 (TI has changed the scale of calculation from 10 to 100) and reached the highest position in 2015, being ranked 29th out of 168 countries in the TI CPI with a score of 63 out of 100 (where 100 indicates no corruption).

It is our hope that Ukraine can benefit from Poland’s experience as it embarks on a similar path. The EU4PFM program stands ready to support Ukraine in adopting and implementing key elements and initiatives that will strengthen the anti-corruption framework within Ukrainian customs, aiding the country in its goal of achieving EU membership by 2030.

Jurgita Domeikiene, 

Team Leader, EU Public Finance Management Support Program (EU4PFM)

Jacek Kapica, 

EU4PFM Expert

formed Head of the Polish Customs Service (2008-2015)